on the effects of corruption on democratic principles such as accountability, equality, and fairness. We go beyond these earlier studies by establishing a connection between corruption and mass perceptions of how well the political system works and whether public officials can be trusted across widely different contemporary democracies. Second, our research breaks new ground in the study of political legitimacy by focusing on corruption, an indicator of political performance and an explanatory variable not usually examined in studies of political support. Thus, we seek to develop a more complete understanding of the legitimacy of political systems by examining whether and how corruption affects attitudes about government. Third, our research examines the contingent nature of the relationships among corruption, political allegiances, and political support. In particular, we seek to determine whether individual-level factors, such as having allegiance to those in power, can serve to neutralize the negative impact of corruption on people's views of the political system. If they do, inferior performance may not necessarily be recognized by all citizens, and we may not see a decrease in the level of public support for political authority as a result among important segments of the electorate.
The next section describes some of the gaps in what we know about the relationship between corruption and mass support for the political system. Subsequently, we discuss the hypothesized effect of political allegiance on attitudes about government, as well as our contention of why the effect of corruption on political support may hinge, in part, on membership in the political majority and minority. We then turn to issues of measurement and data analysis. After presenting the results, we discuss the importance of the findings for the study of political support in democracies and spell out avenues for further research.
Corruption and Attitudes Toward Government
Political trust or system support is an important indicator of a healthy civic and democratic political culture. Scholars commonly assume that disenchanted citizens are more likely to push for radical changes in the system, and that distrust of government may be detrimental to the establishment and survival of democratic life in the long run. It also is widely acknowledged that system outputsalso commonly referred to as system performance-are key to understanding why public support for the political system fluctuates (Easton 1965) . Curiously, economic performance has been the most widely studied facet of system performance that shapes the reputation of political institutions. In contrast, the question of how political performance affects system support has received much more limited attention by social scientists.1 The few studies that do exist are important, however, because they show that political performance and the functioning of formal political institutions matters for how people view the functioning of the political system. Below, we seek to add to our understanding of the effects of political performance on political support by investigating whether and how informal institutions and practices in the form of corruption influence people's attitudes toward the existing political order. Examining the effects of corruption, which we define as "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 32), means investigating a phenomenon whose existence is more difficult to conceptualize and measure than that of economic performance or formal political institutions, and whose consequences are not always obvious. A voluminous literature has documented the negative effects of corruption on a nation's social and economic life (for reviews, see Montinola and Jackman 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1999). More importantly for the purposes of this study, however, corruption also has been found to fundamentally undermine the principles of democratic accountability, equality, and openness (Dahl 1971) .2 When corruption is present, democracy's tenets of procedural and distributive fairness become a myth; this, in turn, is likely to diminish the legitimacy 'Few comparative studies have examined how formal political institutions and their outputs affect support for the political system. Among them, Listhaug (1990, 1999) , for example, have found that opportunities to express discontent and positive perceptions of procedural and outcome fairness are related to positive attitudes about government (see also Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999) . Similarly, studies have shown that more proportional electoral systems are associated with higher levels of regime support (Anderson 1998) . Aside from institutional elements such as opportunities for dissent, it appears that government stability matters for how people view the political system. Specifically, people in systems with more durable governments are more supportive of the existing political arrangements (Harmel and Robertson 1986) . Finally, studies of system support in new democracies have pointed to the importance of political performance as determinants of support for democratic institutions more generally (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Rose 1997, 2001a) , and that the institutional quality of domestic institutions can affect support for supranational institutions (Rohrschneider 2002 ). 2For example, corruption undermines democratic rule when public goods are available only for those who have either connections or money (or both) (Treisman 2000) . And although corruption does not necessarily prevent a government from accomplishing society's ends, it will do so inefficiently. As a result, corruption violates important principles of modern bureaucracy, including the idea that public agencies should operate in an impartial and rule-based fashion (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000 (Seligson 2002) . Given the potential for endogeneity among the primaryvariables of interest (trust and reports of corruption) inherent in the study's cross-sectional individual-level research design and the select, small number of countries examined, these results are suggestive of a correlation among the relevant individual-level constructs but far from generalizable across a wider range of contemporary democracies.
At this time, the empirical record thus is insufficient and open to crucial challenges when it comes to determining conclusively whether there is a relationship between corruption and system support at the individual level once alternative explanations of system support are accounted for. For one, when present, the effects of corruption on system support have not been found to be overwhelmingly strong. Moreover, because the sample of countries considered in these studies has been limited to new democracies in Eastern Europe or Latin Americathat is, countries that score relatively high on corruption and related factors, such as level of development-it is uncertain whether corruption is correlated with political support in countries representing varying levels of wealth and different political cultures.
Moreover, it is yet to be determined whether citizens associate corruption with the political system generally or specific political actors, such as government bureaucrats. Below, we therefore compare the effect of corruption on one general attitude toward government-evaluations of the performance of the political system generally-and one specific attitude particularly relevant to the question of corruption-trust in civil servants. At the outset, it is not obvious whether both attitudes should be affected, or whether they should be affected similarly by the presence of corruption. Given that much of everyday corruption is perpetrated by government bureaucrats, while the political system is a more abstract and distant object of consideration, attitudes toward civil servants are the more proximate measure in the context of this study. Following this logic, we would expect stronger effects of corruption on trust in civil servants than on evaluations of system performance. At the same time, it is plausible that people will be more willing to identify corruption as a systemic problem than to lay the blame for corruption on the doorstep of specific actors they have encountered. After all, it is possible that citizens themselves either are civil servants or know someone who is and, therefore, may be more willing to blame an anonymous set of institutions than specific individuals they know. Moreover, because the political process involves multiple governmental agents, citizens may have more evidence available about the system and how well it functions than about specific actors (Weatherford 1987 Aside from the psychological mechanisms that may condition people's views of corruption, there also may be direct pay-offs associated with corruption that are more likely to accrue to one part of the population than another. In particular, we hypothesize that government supporters are more likely to be the beneficiaries of the goods distributed by corrupt public officials in the form of attention by officials, favorable treatment in the awarding of government contracts, or patronage jobs, for example (Fiorina and Noll 1978; Golden n.d.; Warner 1997). As a result, those with an allegiance to the incumbent government also are likely to take a more benign view of corruption because it benefits them personally.
In sum, we argue that those who elected the incumbent government are less likely to seek out information about corruption and less likely to interpret such information negatively. Moreover, we posit that, when corruption occurs, it is more likely to benefit supporters of the government than supporters of the opposition. As a result, corruption should produce less of a negative impact on political support among those who elected the incumbent government (the majority) than among those who supported the opposition (the minority).
Data and Measures
Our individual-level data come from surveys collected as part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 1996 as part of a study called Role of Government III. Countries that provided the most important survey items and that had a sufficient number of cases for multivariate analysis included Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States. Thus, we were able to employ surveys from a diverse set of countries with widely varying political cultures, structures, and histories.
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variable indicators tap into different dimensions of support for the political regime, with one geared toward general evaluations of the system's performance and the other asking respondents to evaluate particular institutional actors-civil servants.4 To measure performance evaluations, respondents were asked: "All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in (country) works these days?" The answer categories were: "It works well and needs no changes; it works well, but needs some changes; it does not work well and needs a lot of changes; it does not work well and needs to be completely changed." These answer categories ranged from 1 to 4, with 4 denoting the most positive and 1 the most negative evaluation.
This measure does not capture citizen attitudes toward democracy as an ideal; instead, it focuses on people's responses to the actual process of democratic governance and their attitudes toward a country's "constitutional reality" (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995, 328). Using Easton's categories, this indicator has been identified as a measure of support for the performance of the political regime (cf. Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999). Because it allows us to connect corruption, which we argue to be an indicator of system performance, with an evaluation of the performance of the system in the eyes of its citizens, this measure is particularly useful for our purposes.
4Using a single item indicator, as opposed to a multi-item construct, may compromise the reliability of our dependent variables. Note, however, that adding more items to an indicator has no direct effect on its validity (Guilford 1954; Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Moreover, an unreliable dependent variable does not bias regression estimates, but it makes it harder to achieve statistical significance (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
To gauge whether people had trust in civil servants, they were presented with the following statement: "Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country." Respondents could answer "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree." This question gauges people's trust in a fairly specific set of actors-more specific, certainly, than asking about the political system as a whole. Generally, this question and similar ones aimed at parliament, the courts, the armed services, etc., have been considered indicators of support for regime institutions (cf. Klingemann 1999). The variable was coded as a five-category measure that ranked trust from 1 to 5, with 5 denoting the most trusting response. 
Independent Variables
Corruption. Recall that our primary goal is to test the following relationships: (1) between corruption and attitudes toward government, (2) between political allegiances and attitudes toward government, and (3) the interactive effects of corruption and political allegiance on attitudes toward government. To estimate the impact of corruption, we need to connect attitudes about government with information about corrupt practices in the respondent's country. To do so, we combined a countrylevel measure of corruption with the individual-level surveys.
Our measure of corruption is based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency 6Because the CPI for 1996 did not include data for Latvia and Slovenia, we used the data for 1998 instead, assuming that corruption levels are unlikely to change radically over time. Inspection of trends in the CPI data for other countries confirms that this was a reasonable assumption (see also Treisman 2000).
for totally clean from corruption and 10 indicates a highly corrupt country.7 Figure 2 shows the distribution of the corruption index across the countries included in this study. As in the case of the political support questions, the data show considerable cross-national variation in corruption. On average, the countries included in the analysis were only moderately corrupt at 3.1. The highest levels of corruption were found in Russia and Latvia (at over 7 on the 10-point scale), whereas the cleanest countries turned out to be 7Our research design requires that our measure of corruption be exogenous to attitudes toward the system. Given that our corruption index is a measure of public and elite perceptions of corruption (albeit aggregated at the system level), it is possible that our measure of corruption, at least in small part, is endogenous to the model. To test whether this was the case, we conducted a Hausman two-step test of exogeneity (Hausman 1978 cycle, over-and underreporting both are possible, given that governments' honeymoon is usually followed by a decline in popular support during the electoral term. When present, overreporting is likely to be less problematic because it implies that some of the respondents who claim to have voted for the victor in fact did not. In this case, some of the respondents classified as belonging to the majority are, in fact, members of the minority. This would lead to underestimating the true effect of having voted for the winning party or parties. As a check on the accuracy of the reported vote, we compared the aggregate distributions of actual election outvoted for the current government, he was coded as belonging to the majority (coded 1); all others were coded 0. To examine the interaction between levels of corruption and political allegiance on attitudes toward the system, we also added an interaction term (majority-minority status * corruption) to the equation.
Control Variables
We also sought to control for a variety of factors that have been found to predict support for the political system in previous analyses. Including these variables avoids drawing faulty inferences due to spuriousness that can result from omitting relevant variables. Several specific issues may pose problems for inference because of the multilevel nature of our data. First, the intercepts may be variable across countries; failure to control for this may result in biased estimates. Specifically, if intercepts are variable, we may be overestimating the effect of corruption on system support, as the corruption coefficient could be capturing both the true effects of corruption as well as other country-specific effects.l4 A secondary concern is that the individual level variables may have unequal slopes across nations. In this case a pooled estimator may be biased for each particular country. A third concern relates to the robustness of our inferences based on potentially inefficient standard errors resulting from potential clustering (cf. Zorn 2001). To deal with these issues, multilevel modeling techniques allow for estimating varying intercepts and slopes, produce asymptotically efficient standard errors, and provide for a direct estimation of variance components at each level of the model. Below, we show the coefficients of interest (constants and independent variables), as well as the variance components at each level of our data (individual and countrylevel). These estimations allow us to establish (a) whether corruption is a significant determinant of system support once we allow the intercepts to vary across countries and obtain better estimates of standard errors; and (b) whether our macro-variables explain a substantial proportion of the country-level variance in order for us to be able to claim that we have minimized a potential omitted variable bias.
Analysis of Variance
To determine, first, whether there is significant variation in system support at the individual and country levels, we estimated an ANOVA model that decomposes the variance in the dependent variables, where 14A way to capture variable intercepts would be to introduce a series of dummy variables for each country in the data set, but one. In our case, however, this solution is impossible, because of perfect multicollinearity among the macro-level variables and the set of country dummies. Regardless of estimation method, the results provide unambiguous evidence in support of our main hypothesis: individuals in countries with higher levels of corruption evaluate the performance of the political system more negatively. In short, corruption breeds discontent with the performance of the political system. The results obtained with the random intercept models (Models 1 and 2) show that the corruption coefficient was statistically and substantively significant. As importantly, the bootstrapped results shown in Models 3 and 4, which reexamine the results of the fully interactive Model 2, indicate that these results were extremely robust. Visual inspection of the distribution of the coefficients for corruption showed them to be normally distributed.
Our results also show that those who voted for parties in power had more positive attitudes toward the political system. As expected, citizens in the political majority thought the political system worked better than did those in the minority. Again, all four models using different estimation techniques showed that this result was significant and extremely robust.
To better understand the estimated substantive impact of the variables of interest, we calculated how average respondents' evaluations of the political system varied '6Bootstrapping procedures estimate the sampling distribution of a statistic, treating the sample as a population. We present results estimated by both parametric and nonparametric bootstrapping. In the parametric bootstrap procedure, MLwiN resamples from the residual distribution specified by the model at each level, which in our particular model is assumed to be normal. The model is then refitted using these responses. In the parametric bootstrap procedure confidence intervals are estimated in accordance with the normal distribution sampling theory and are easy to interpret. However, since we did not have any strong reasons to believe that our residuals are distributed normally, we also performed nonparametric bootstrapping, which does not require any distributional assumptions. However, note that the more complex computation of confidence intervals in the nonparametric bootstrap procedure calls for more caution when drawing inferences on the basis of results obtained with this procedure (Mooney 1996 with different levels of corruption. Using the coefficients from the fully specified Model 2, we find that a typical respondent in a country where corruption is absent scores a 3.22 on the four-point scale measuring respondents' system performance evaluations. In contrast, the average respondent in a country in the most corrupt category scores a 2.61, while respondents in a country scoring in the mid-range of the corruption measure (=5) score a 2.80. Looking at the effect of being in the majority or minority on system performance evaluations, we find that the average respondent in the majority scores a 3.04 and those in the minority a 2.91 on the four-point scale.
Contingent effects. To test the hypothesis that there is an interactive effect of corruption and majority-minority status on views about government, Models 2-4 also included an interaction variable for political majority status and corruption. The results show robust support for the contention that corruption has less of a negative effect on evaluations of the political system among respondents in the political majority. Thus, in keeping with our prediction, we find that being in the majority attenuates the negative effects of corruption on people's views of the political system. Moreover, this effect is particularly pronounced in the more corrupt systems. As Figure 3 shows, in a completely honest system, being in the political majority or minority makes little difference to people's evaluations of the political system, with the average system evaluation at around 3.2. In contrast, in a completely corrupt system, members of the political majority still have a reasonable chance of evaluating the system positively, with an average score of 2.67, while those in the minority expressing a less positive view at 2.28. At this extreme end of the corruption scale, there was thus a significant difference in the effect of corruption on evaluations of the system between the political majority and minority.
Moving from the least corrupt to the most corrupt system reduces the average value on the four-point scale by .55 from 3.22 to 2.67 among the majority, while it decreases evaluations among the minority by about twice as much (from 3.20 to 2.28). Thus, while corruption had a negative effect on evaluations of the system among both segments of the population, this effect was much more pronounced among those in the minority. Most of the other variables included in the analysis also achieved conventional levels of statistical significance. Regarding the individual-level control variables, the results show that women were consistently less happy with the system than men. Similarly, moving up on the political interest scale (from less interested to more interested) increased a level of satisfaction with the performance of the political system. Also, as hypothesized, we found that socioeconomic status had a highly significant effect on attitudes toward government. Those in the upper class had significantly more favorable evaluations of the system than those in the middle and lower classes. In addition, people with jobs and with higher levels of education also were more positive in their evaluations of the political system. Similarly, those who did not participate in the previous election exhibited lower levels of support for the political system. Among the individual level predictors, age was the only one that did not exert significant effects on how people evaluated the performance of the political system.17
Looking at the macro-variables, the results show that level of economic development increased positive evaluations of the system's performance. Consistent with expectations, we also found that economic growth had a positive impact on people's views of the political system. In contrast, however, the democratic performance indicators did not have the hypothesized effects. We found that level of democracy was not related to system performance evaluations. Thus, once levels of development and economic performance were accounted for, citizens in more democratic countries were no more critical of the way their political system worked. Similarly, democratic age did not affect evaluations of the political system once other macro-level factors were accounted for.
17To establish whether the slopes of our individual-level independent variables are equal across countries, we also calculated country-level variance components for each n-coefficient separately while allowing it to vary randomly around its mean. As it turned out, the variability of the slopes was extremely small, and we therefore do not report on them further. 
The Effects of Corruption and Political Allegiance on Trust in Civil Servants
Direct effects. Table 3 shows the results of multilevel maximum likelihood (IGLS) and the bootstrapped estimates of the effects of corruption and majority-minority status on trust in civil servants. The models we estimated are identical to those in Table 2 ; the only difference is in the dependent variable. Again, the results unequivocally support our main hypothesis: individuals in countries with higher levels of corruption are less trusting in civil servants. Moreover, the results for both standard random intercept models (Models 1 and 2) as well as the models employing the bootstrap procedures demonstrate that the corruption coefficient is statistically and substantively significant. Thus, as in the case of general system evaluations, the results are extremely robust; they point to a significant corroding effect of corruption on trust in civil servants. Again, visual inspection of the distribution of the coefficients for corruption showed them to be normally distributed. Our results also show that respondents who were among the majority were significantly more trusting of civil servants than those in the minority. The results are virtually identical across the random intercept model and the bootstrap models. Using the coefficients from the fully specified Model 2, we find that a typical respondent in a country where corruption is absent scores a 4.26 on the five-point scale measuring respondents' trust in civil servants. In contrast, a respondent in a country in the most corrupt category scores a 2.76, while respondents in a country in the mid-range of the corruption scale (=5) rate civil servants a 3.33. Looking at the effect of being in the majority or minority on trust in civil servants, we find that those in the majority score a 3.98 and those in the minority a 3.83 in the average country.
Contingent effects. As in the case of general system evaluations, the results show that the negative effects of corruption on people's trust in civil servants is of varying strength among those in the majority and the minority. Thus, corruption affects those in the minority more strongly than those in the majority, indicating that the negative effect of corruption on trust in civil servants is attenuated among those in the political majority. However, this effect is weaker in the case of trust in civil servants than general system evaluations; the coefficient for the interaction variable is considerably smaller and manages to achieve statistical significance only at the .1 level (one-tailed). Thus, the results indicate that interactive effect of corruption and political majority-minority status is much stronger in the case of general system evaluations than for trust in civil servants. The other variables in the analysis did not all manage to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in the models estimating trust in civil servants. The only significant individual-level determinants were class, electoral participation, and age. Thus, individuals of higher social status, those who report having voted and having greater political interest, and older respondents were more trusting of civil servants. In contrast, employment status, gender, and education did not affect people's views of civil servants in their country. More generally, when we compare the effects of the individual-level variables on evaluations of the political system and trust in civil servants reported in Tables 2 and 3 , we found that these were clearly better able to explain variation in system performance evaluations than in trust in civil servants.
Aside from corruption, the only macro-level variable achieving statistical significance was economic growth, indicating that individuals in countries with higher levels of growth were more trusting of civil servants. In contrast, levels of development, democracy, or democratic age did not exert any statistically significant effects on trust in civil servants.18
Discussion
Building on studies that have documented the farreaching negative effects of corruption on the economy, the legal system, and democratic principles, we investigated how corruption affects citizens' attitudes toward '8Tables 2 and 3 also contain estimates of the variance components, which we can compare with the estimates reported in Table  1 . As the results show, the variability of the intercept among countries was relatively small, ranging between .017 and .024 across the four models for evaluations of system performance and between .045 and .067 for trust in civil servants. In addition, the magnitude of the predicted effect for the corruption variable was very similar to the single intercept model (results not shown here). Finally, country-level variance estimates show that we are unlikely to have an omitted variable bias at the macro-level. After estimating our full models, we manage to explain between 78 and 85 percent of the country-level variance in the system performance models and between 32 and 55 percent of the country-level variance in the trust in civil servants models. As a result, the models explain a significant portion of the total variance attributed to the variation among countries, with the system performance models outperforming the trust in civil servants models. Thus, we believe the threat of an omitted variable bias at the country-level to be small, especially for the system performance estimations, because (a) the models account for a substantial portion of the country-level variation with the macro-variables included in our analysis (especially in the case of system evaluations), and (b) the remaining unexplained country-level variance constitutes a small portion of the total unexplained variance (which mostly comes from differences among individuals). The analysis supported our hypothesis. Moreover, we hypothesized that these effects would be mediated by people's political allegiances. As predicted, the effects of corruption on political support were weaker for citizens who had elected the incumbent government (members of the political majority) and stronger for those who had cast votes for the opposition (members of the political minority). However, we also found that these interaction effects were much stronger with regard to general system evaluations than for trust in civil servants. We discuss these results and their implications below. The consistent finding that corruption leads people to believe that the political system performs worse than it could and that those who work for the state cannot be trusted is important, first, because it strongly suggests that corruption is likely to be an important component Building on prior research, we find that people's status as members of the political majority or minority strongly affects their perceptions of how well the political system works and whether civil servants can be trusted. This finding lends further support to the notion that taking political allegiance into account is critical for understanding and predicting how citizens will respond in the political arena. More importantly, we found that allegiance to those in power provides a lens through which people view the political world around them. While government and opposition supporters in very clean countries are both likely to have positive views of the political system, there is a significant difference in the negative effects of corruption on evaluations of the political system's performance among members of the majority and the minority in more corrupt countries. Specifically, the views of those who voted for the government are affected less negatively by high levels of corruption than the views of those who voted for the opposition.
Election outcomes not only determine who occupies the seats of power, but they also determine the extent to which citizens are satisfied with their political outcomes, are willing to push for change, and view their political environments as friendly or hostile places. In other words, by determining who wins and who loses, elections create a lens through which people evaluate their political context and that shapes political behavior generally. However, this effect is not uniform. Our results indicate that majority-minority status mediates the effect of corruption on trust in civil servants to a much lesser extent. Thus, while we find that corruption and majority-minority status both directly affect trust in civil servants, the mediating effect of the majority-minority status "lens" appears much more relevant when it comes to connecting corruption with general system evaluations than the trustworthiness of a specific set of actors (civil servants).
It is worth mentioning that the distinction between majority and minority is a truly political variable. Unlike predictors such as education or partisan attachment, which are determined relatively early in life, political majority-minority status is a direct product of the political process, and it can vary with each election cycle for individual citizens. Thus, by examining how majorityminority status affects such important political phenomena as participation in the political system and attitudes toward government, we can connect social and individual choices in ways that are easily compared across elections and countries. Our findings thus further highlight the significance of the majority-minority distinction for theory and contribute to a growing literature that seeks to understand how political allegiance and election outcomes affect political behavior. More generally, we explain people's support for their system by examining the contingent effects of an individual-level variable that has been found to play a critical role in previous studies (political minority-majority status), and a contextual variable (corruption) that has received little empirical attention in the system support literature. By integrating both micro-and macro-level explanations of system support, our analysis enhances our understanding of how citizens view the institutions of representative democracy in countries with different levels of public honesty. By doing so, it enhances our understanding of the nature of political support. The results show that the comparative study of political attitudes is especially fruitful when it combines the particular political context in which people form those attitudes-in this case, a country's political performance in the form of corruption-with critical individual-level variables-in this case, political allegiance-because it leads to a more general model and comprehensive understanding of the forces that shape citizen political behavior.
The finding that corruption undermines citizens' faith in their governments is sobering, and it has noteworthy implications for policymakers. For one, it is well known that corruption is higher in countries that have adopted democracy more recently. Transitions to democracy can be quite painful for citizens, causing economic insecurity and uncertainty about what the future will bring. While corruption, if discovered and punished, can provide an impetus for democratic reform (Manion 1998; Rose, Shin, and Munro 1999), it also may leave citizens wondering why they should endure the challenges of a painful transition when others seem to be profiting from illegal and dishonest activity. This line of reasoning and the results we report above suggest that when a political system is tainted by corruption, people's willingness to accept government-initiated reforms or even the legitimacy of the system as a whole may flag. In the long term, this can pose significant challenges to the sustainability of democratic government.
While corruption traditionally has been considered a practices are certainly worthwhile and likely to ensure a healthier and more legitimate political system. However, we also would argue that the results presented here do not necessarily bode well for those hoping to inject reforms into corrupt governments, nor do they suggest obvious remedies for fighting corruption. Maybe most importantly, our results pose a challenge to those seeking to fight corruption because they imply that inferior performance leads to a parallel reduction in public support for political authority among all citizens with regard to trust in civil servants but not when it comes to evaluations of the performance of the system as a whole. Thus, members of the political minority face an uphill battle if they set their sights on reducing corruption as a systemic condition because those in the majority evaluate the performance of the regime more positively than those in the minority, even when levels of corruption are high. As a consequence, those in the political majority are unlikely to be as motivated to push for systemic changes as those in the minority. This is likely to complicate efforts to reduce corruption and leads us to speculate that outside pressures or exogenous shocks may be vital for battling corrupt government practices and maintaining or improving the legitimacy of democratic political systems.
Appendix A Measures and Coding
Evaluations of Political System Performance. "All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in (country) works these days?" It works well and needs no changes (4), it works well but needs some changes (3), it does not work well and needs a lot of changes (2), it does not work well and needs to be completely changed (1). 
Trust in Civil

